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Abstract 
To point out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations, this 
paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-
2012 climate regime. The paper argues that developing country commitments are most 
unlikely to go beyond the defined polices and measures in this timeframe. On this basis, 
the paper suggests that, rather than attempting the unrealistic goal, international climate 
negotiations may instead need to initially frame the post-2012 developing country 
participation in terms of certain policies and policies that I envisioned a decade ago. This 
conclusion does not change, as Barack Obama becomes the U.S. President and the 
Democrats have regained control over both U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. 
However, it should be emphasized that his stance on climate issues and how ambitious 
U.S. commitments would be under his administration are going to be critical for 
developing countries to take bold steps themselves and to even agree to reflect those 
national commitments in a global deal. 
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1. Introduction 
At the Bali Climate Change Conference in December 2007, all governments agreed to 
launch a far reaching negotiation process to reach an agreement to a successor to the 
Kyoto Protocol, which is going to expire by the end of 2012. Given that many 
governments at the Montreal Climate Change Conference two years ago were even barely 
prepared to open an informal dialogue on future climate actions, this move is a significant 
step forward. It opens the way for the first time to a comprehensive negotiation of post-
2012 agreement, with a clear deadline for the conclusion by 2009. 
 
It is widely understood that the Bali roadmap is aimed to set emission commitments for 
Annex I countries beyond 2012. However, for the first time, developing countries in Bali 
agreed to commit to mitigation actions. While it is not clear yet whether these actions are 
existing unilateral ones or beyond, their willingness to consider mitigation actions in the 
next agreement raises the expectation for developing country commitments.  
 
The question then is what can be expected from developing countries in an immediate 
post-2012 climate regime. This paper will focus on this issue. By revisiting the six 
options for China that I envisioned a decade ago and examining a variety of factors, the 
paper first discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate 
post-2012 climate regime. It argues that developing country commitments are most 
unlikely to go beyond the defined polices and measures in this timeframe. On this basis, 
the paper then suggests that, rather than attempting the unrealistic goal, international 
climate negotiations may instead need to initially frame the post-2012 developing country 
participation in terms of certain policies and policies that I envisioned a decade ago. This 
conclusion does not change, as Barack Obama becomes the U.S. President and the 
Democrats have regained control over both U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.  
 
 
2. What can be expected from developing countries in an immediate post-2012 
climate regime? 
To address this issue, let’s go back to international climate negotiations prior to Kyoto 
and subsequently until the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Prior to Kyoto, developing counties’ demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership 
and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases 
below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in 
greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. 
The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. 
economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. This may give the U.S. some “moral” 
right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful mitigation action. After Kyoto, 
the ball was kicked into China’s court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key 
developing countries, including China, on board had been and would continue to be its 
focus of international climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it 
will be countries like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for 
China to make some kind of commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. 
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The world’s media will undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which 
will be seen as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly 
even be blamed for “blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with 
developing countries’ commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and 
public pressure on China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. Under these 
circumstances, I envisioned a decade ago the following six proposals that could be put on 
the table as China’s plausible negotiation position, which is each described in ascending 
order of stringency (Zhang, 2000).1 
 
“First, China could regard its active participation in CDM as “meaningful participation”. 
Second, just as Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to “have 
made demonstrable progress” in achieving their commitments by 2005, China could 
commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at 
some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Securing the undefined 
“demonstrable progress” regarding China’s efforts is the best option that China should 
fight for at the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. 
 
Third, if the above commitment is not considered “meaningful”, China could make 
voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and 
measures might need to be developed to explicitly demonstrate whether or not China has 
made adequate efforts. Such policies and measures might include abolishing energy 
subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energies, and 
increasing the R&D spending on developing environmentally sound coal technologies. 
 
Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. In my 
view, carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy 
(i.e., total energy consumption per unit of GDP) because all the efforts towards shifting 
away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former. 
 
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a 
particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, 
although already burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage 
from the sector to those sectors whose emissions are not capped. 
 
This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon 
intensity level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or 
beyond 2020. This is the bottom line: China cannot afford to go beyond it until its per 
capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries.” It looked like 
                                                 
1 Zhang (2000) was originally prepared for the United Nations Development Programme 
in 1998. When the draft of that paper was ready, the Washington DC-based Resources for 
the Future made a press release titled “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions?”, September 15, 1998. 
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China would be pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China 
wished. This situation has changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Anyhow, international efforts towards a post-Kyoto climate regime continues. A decade 
later, we see that the carbon intensity and sectoral approaches-based commitments, which 
were discussed in the academic literature ten years ago, are formally incorporated into the 
Bali roadmap. This is a very positive development, and clearly indicates the policy 
relevance of the once-sound-theoretical ideas. However, given the very short timeframe 
to conclude the negotiations, in all likelihood, it would be impossible to reach the 
necessary agreement on the rules, countries and sectors covered and the levels of 
ambitions for developing countries, especially due to the amount of the data that would 
be required. As it has been indicated by the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Leaders Summit in September 2007, setting a carbon intensity target, even if it is not 
binding, is not that easy. Australia, the host country, proposed that all 21 APEC 
economies, regardless of whether they are developed and developing economies, agree to 
reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, but in the end the leaders only agreed to 
work towards achieving an APEC-wide (emphasis added) aspirational goal in energy 
intensity by at least 25% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels (Zhang, 2008a). This should not 
come as a surprise because energy use per unit of GDP, a key indicator of patterns of 
energy use, is still high in many developing Asian countries, and even increased in 
countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korean and Thailand between 
1990 and 2004. Indonesia and Pakistan consumed almost the same amount of energy per 
unit of GDP as they were in 1990 (Figure 1). Even the rate of energy efficiency 
improvement in IEA countries has been less than 1% per year since 1990 – much lower 
than in previous decades (IEA, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1  Energy use per unit of GDP in the selected Asia Pacific countries, 1990-2004 
(Tons of oil equivalent/million 2000 US$). 
Source: Zhang (2008a). 
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Moreover, it is inconceivable that developing countries would ever go beyond the 
aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 without an effective financial 
mechanism. This is the lesson learned from the Montreal Protocol.2 The CDM under the 
Kyoto Protocol serves as a channel to provide finance and technology transfer to 
developing countries. The CDM market increased from 563 MtCO2 equivalent of 
certified emission reductions (CERs) and  €3.9 billion in 2006 to 947 MtCO2 equivalent 
of CERs and  €12 billion in 2007 (Point Carbon, 2008). While the CDM has emerged as a 
financing mechanism to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as the implementation of 
CDM projects has progressed, it still does not work to full potential scale. To that end, 
change needs to take place both at national and international levels. At the national level, 
for those developing countries that have not truly benefited from the CDM, they need to 
put in place clear institutional structures, streamlined and transparent CDM procedures 
and sound governance of clearer lines of responsibility and functions to facilitate the 
smooth implementation of CDM projects in their countries. At the international level, 
post-Kyoto climate negotiations need to reform the CDM to overcome its current 
structural limitations and to make it accommodate those players and types of small 
projects that have been left out to date. When taken together and combined, they will help 
to expand the number and geographical reach of the CDM, thus spreading its benefits to 
more countries (Zhang, 2008a). Nevertheless, markets cannot deliver miracles. Market 
                                                 
2 See Zhang (2008b) for further discussion on the lesson learned from the Montreal 
Protocol and its implications for multilateral trade measures in a post-2012 climate 
regime as well as whether the funds established within the climate regime can deliver as 
the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol did. 
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instruments like CDM, as useful as it may be, must be complemented with traditional 
fund solutions that provide a stable source of funding.  
 
Now let’s have a look at the funds established within the climate regime. The Special 
Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund are established under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As of October 2, 
2008, the total pledged for these two funds (cumulatively, not per year) is US$279 
million (Table 1). The only fund under the Kyoto Protocol is the Adaptation Fund. The 
level of its funding depends on the quantity of CERs issued and their prices. Assuming 
annual sales of 300-450 million tons of CERs and a market price of US$24 per ton of 
CERs, the Adaptation Fund would receive US$80-300 million per year for the period 
2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 2007). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) as an entity 
operating the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC has targeted the amount of US$950 
from its fourth replenishment at climate change projects over the period 2006-2010. 
Combined together, the pledges and contributions from all these three funds and the 
GEF Trust Fund are well below US$1 billion a year. 
 
By contrast, according to the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), the incremental costs of low 
carbon investments in developing countries are likely to be at least US$20-30 billion a 
year. This is a very conservative estimate. The UNFCCC (2007) puts the investment 
estimates for climate change adaptation in developing countries in the range of US$28-67 
billion a year. On mitigation, the UNFCCC (2007) estimates the investment of US$76 
billion needed in developing countries a year.3 So, developing countries will need the 
investment of at least US$100 billion in climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
However, the contributions from all these three funds and the GEF Trust Fund only 
amount to less than one percent of the anticipated needs from developing countries. 
This suggests that the ratio of the combined pledged funding from the funds to the 
required investment at 1:100. 
 
 
Table 1  The amount of pledges and contributions from the multilateral financial 
mechanisms under the Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol 
 
Sources Amount (million US$) 
Special Climate Change Fund 
Least Developed Countries Fund 
Adaptation Fund 
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 
(allocated to climate change focal area)  
106.57 (pledged) 
172.44  (pledged) 
80-300 per year (estimated) 
 
950 (targeted for 2006-2010) 
 
Sources: Global Environment Facility (2008a); UNFCCC (2007). 
 
                                                 
3 The estimates vary. The World Bank (2006) estimates the incremental, upfront capital 
costs of US$30 billion per year to decarbonize the power sector in developing countries 
alone. 
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Table 2  GEF Trust Fund allocations and co-financing in the climate change focal area 
 
GEF Phase GEF Grant 
(million US$) 
Co-financing 
(million US$ 
Pilot phase (1991-1994) 
GEF 1 (1994-1998) 
GEF 2 (1998-2002) 
GEF 3 (2002-2006) 
GEF 4 (2006-2010) 
      2007 
      2008 
      2009 
Total 
284.80 
510.36 
681.07 
877.72 
950.00 (targeted) 
76.35 
138.45 
88.26 
2657.01 
2402.89 
2322.10 
3403.40 
4810.56 
 
1651.82 
1119.46 
514.04 
16224.28 
 
Source: Global Environment Facility (2008b). 
 
 
The value of a single multilateral fund lies in its ability to leverage contributions from a 
range of other donors. Can these funds leverage co-financing from other sources to close 
this financing gap? Let’s look at the recent record of leverage of multilateral funding. 
Since 1990, the World Bank Group commitments to renewable energy and efficiency 
have exceeded US$10 billion, with each dollar leveraging another three dollars from 
other private and public sources (Cundy, 2006). The GEF as an entity operating the 
financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, since its inception in 1991, has provided $8.26 
billion in grants and generated over $33.7 billion in co-financing from other sources to 
support over 2,200 projects that produce global environmental benefits in 165 developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition.4 As indicated in Table 2, in the 
focal area of climate change, as at November 2008, the GEF has allocated since its 
inception a total of US$2.66 billion from the GEF Trust Fund. This GEF funding has 
leveraged a co-financing in excess of US$16.22 billion. This suggests that the GEF 
enjoys an average leverage ratio of 4.1 in the all six focal areas and 6.1 in the climate 
change focal area, meaning that each dollar of the GEF grant leverages US$4.1-6.1 from 
other sources. Assuming the leverage ratio of 6 and the minimum requirement of US$100 
billion per year, then the current commitments are only able to bring the total finance 
value to US$7 billion and leave the financing gap of US$93 billion per year. To close this 
gap, we need to increase the multilateral funding and enhance its leverage ability. 
Assuming the leverage ratio of 10, which has not experienced over the long time horizon 
for multibillion public funding, and the minimum requirement of US$100 billion per year, 
then the multilateral funding needs to be increased to US$10 billion per year to meet 
developing country needs for climate change mitigation and adaptation. If the funding 
available under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC remains at its current level and 
continues to rely mainly on voluntary contributions, it will not be sufficient to address the 
                                                 
4 See “The About GEF” at the GEF web site at: 
http://www.thegef.org/interior.aspx?id=50 (accessed on November 14, 2008). 
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future financial flows estimated to be needed for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries. Unless this funding situation changes significantly, 
which is most unlikely to happen, developing countries cannot afford to make 
commitments beyond the third option above-envisioned a decade ago. 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. factor will continue to play a role in affecting developing country’s 
willingness to take on commitments and the stringency of that commitments. Let’s look 
at the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (S.3036), the most detailed 
bipartisan bill to date to require domestic, mandatory and economy-wide GHG emissions 
reductions in the U.S. beginning January 1, 2012. On June 6, 2008, the U.S. Senate 
debated and held votes on this bill. While it failed to secure the 60 votes needed to close 
debate on the bill and move to a final vote (i.e., to “invoke cloture”), the bill has made 
more headway than any of its precursors because it was the first time that a GHG cap-
and-trade bill had ever come to the floor of the U.S. Senate through regular order—that is, 
having been debated and voted out of a committee. Both the presidential candidates John 
McCain and Barack Obama supported the bill in the Senate, and President-elect Obama 
reiterated his campaign promise of a system to cap and trade greenhouse gas emissions in 
the U.S..Therefore, this Act is likely to serve as a template for any future bill. Under the 
Act, 87% of the U.S. GHG emissions are estimated to be subject to the emission caps that 
are set 19% below the 2005 level by 2020 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2008). 
However, the U.S. GHG emissions were 16.8% higher in 2005 than that in 1990 (EIA, 
2007), and not all emission sources are capped under the Act. As a result, even if the Act 
becomes law, the U.S. GHG emissions in 2020 are probably still above its 1990 level. 
From a U.S perspective, that emission reduction would appear quite ambitious and 
require serious actions and investment, but is still far short of a 7% reduction of the U.S. 
GHG emissions during the period 2008-2012 required by the Kyoto Protocol and a 25-
40% cut by 2020 suggested by the IPCC and demanded by developing countries. In 
expectation that the U.S. would take on the more stringent commitments subsequent to 
the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level), I envisioned a decade ago 
that developing countries may go beyond the aforementioned third option. However, the 
U.S. emissions in 2020 are at best kept at its 1990 level as estimated under the 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. This is far from the point where it is likely that 
developing country would do that.  
 
 
3. Does the election of Senator Barack Obama as the U.S. President make a 
difference? 
In his presidential campaign, Barack Obama supported implementation of a market-based 
cap-and-trade regime to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. 
After being elected, he reiterated his campaign promises of reducing such emissions and 
promoting clean energy at home and actively engaging international climate negotiations. 
Therefore, there is any reason to expect that U.S climate policy in the incoming 
administration will have dramatic departure from the current one against mandatory 
emission cuts. However, whether such major policy shift is quick and aggressive enough 
for a new climate treaty by December 2009 is another story.  
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While it is impossible to predict what greenhouse gas emission target would be ultimately 
set by the U.S. Congress, it is safe to say that that target is unlikely to be more ambitious 
than that of such a state as California that is leading state-level climate efforts. Under the 
so-called Global Warming Solutions Act, California is mandated to cut its emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020. The national emission target that ultimately emerges could well be 
less ambitious than that of California. As discussed above, even if the commitments of 
the aggressive leader are still far short of what developing countries and EU are calling 
for, then the national emission target would be even so. In my view, this situation does 
not change, as Obama becomes the President and the Democrats have regained control 
over both U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, at least on the two grounds. One is 
related to the “regional” character of the U.S. Congress and several major economic 
sectors (e.g., oil and gas production, steel), which have translated into “regional 
influence” in previous environmental policy-making, such as U.S. acid rain legislation 
(Rose and Zhang, 2004). Such regional character may well lead the Democrats from 
those states adversely affected by the emission caps not to vote along the party line in the 
Congress to protect their own constituencies. This may well lead a less ambitious national 
target to ultimately win approval from the Congress. The second is on timing. While 
Obama could begin to tackle climate change without the Congress through administrative 
actions, the new U.S. administration will likely not be in the position to agree to a 
specific emission target when governments meet in Copenhagen, December 2009. That 
can happen only when the Congress has enacted or is on the verge of enacting a 
legislation capping the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (Diringer, 2008). However, the 
Democratic-controlled Congress is unlikely to act until 2010 a bill to cap the U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
This by no means undermines the role of the new Obama administration. Indeed, his 
stance on capping U.S. greenhouse gas emissions is going to be critical both for the U.S. 
Congress to pass on such a bill and for encouraging other countries to go further. Section 
2 lists potential national commitments from developing countries. This does not 
necessarily mean that these national commitments will be reflected in a global deal in 
Copenhagen. Under the new Obama administration, if the U.S. commits itself to 
ambitious environmental goals, combined with the EU leadership role in the climate area 
and the urgency to tackle climate change, developing countries may be forced to take 
bold steps themselves and to even agree to reflect those unilateral commitments in a 
global deal. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The Bali roadmap is aimed to set emission commitments for Annex I countries beyond 
2012. In the meantime, it raises the expectation for developing country commitments. By 
revisiting the six options for China that I envisioned a decade ago and examining a 
variety of factors, this paper suggests that developing country commitments are most 
unlikely to go beyond the third option above-envisioned a decade ago. Rather than 
attempting the unrealistic goal, international climate negotiations may instead need to 
initially frame the post-2012 developing country participation in terms of certain policies 
and policies as envisioned in the aforementioned second and third options. This 
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conclusion does not change, as Barack Obama becomes the U.S. President and the 
Democrats have regained control over both U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. 
However, it should be emphasized that his stance on climate issues and how ambitious 
U.S. commitments would be under his administration are going to be critical for 
developing countries to take bold steps themselves and to even agree to reflect those 
national commitments in a global deal. 
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